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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with a finite number of decoy states is analyzed
under finite-data-size assumption. By accounting for statistical fluctuations in parameter estimation, we investigate
vacuum + weak- and vacuum + two-weak-decoy-state protocols. In each case, we find proper operation regimes,
where the performance of our system is comparable to the asymptotic case for which the key size and the number
of decoy states approach infinity. Our results show that practical implementations of this scheme can be both
secure and efficient.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] is one of the most
successful applications of quantum information processing,
which allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to grow
secret keys with information-theoretic security [3–8]. Con-
ventional security proofs of QKD assume certain physical
models for the employed devices—source and detection
units. For instance, the squashing model is widely assumed
for the measurement [9–11] in a standard security analysis
[12]. Practical implementations, however, could fall short of
meeting all requirements set by the models, hence security
could be compromised in reality. In fact, side channels have
been identified and exploited to break QKD security. These
side-channel attacks include the fake-state attack [13,14], the
time-shift attack [15,16], the phase-remapping attack [17,18],
and the detector-blinding attack [19,20].
Several approaches have been proposed to counter the
side-channel attacks. One way is to sufficiently characterize
the behavior of the devices and analyze the security by taking
into account all device parameters [21–23]. This, however,
can be difficult to implement in practice. A second approach
that can defeat all side-channel attacks is device-independent
QKD [24–26], in which the security can be proven without
knowing the specifications of the devices used. Security, in this
case, is derived from nonlocal correlations by violating Bell’s
inequality [27,28]. In order to avoid the detection efficiency
loophole [29], however, a large fraction of the transmitted
signals must be detected by the receiver, resulting in im-
practical requirements for the transmission efficiency (e.g.,
82.8% [30] for the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
inequality [28]).
Instead of full device independence, a detection-device
independent QKD scheme is proposed [31,32], in which the
detection system is assumed to be untrusted. Since most
of practical hacking strategies focus on the detection site,
and the source site is relatively simple for characterization,
such a scheme can close most loopholes in a QKD system.
Unfortunately, these schemes still need stringent requirements
on the transmission efficiency of more than 50% [31].
*xma@tsinghua.edu.cn
Recently, Lo, Curty, and Qi [33] proposed efficient schemes
that are measurement-device independent (MDI). Alice and
Bob send some signals to a willing participant who can
even be an eavesdropper, Eve. Eve performs a Bell-state
measurement (BSM) and announces the result to Alice and
Bob who will use this information to distill a secret key.
The security is based on the idea of entanglement swapping
using a BSM and the reverse EPR QKD scheme [34–36]. The
scheme is secure even if Eve intentionally makes the wrong
measurement and/or announces the wrong information. Vari-
ous implementation approaches to MDI-QKD have also been
proposed [37,38], and significant efforts have been devoted to
its experimental demonstration [33,39,40]. Recently, the first
MDI-QKD experiment with decoy states is completed by Liu
et al. [41].
MDI-QKD is not completely device independent and the
source devices have to be trusted and sufficiently characterized.
When we use a coherent source to implement a single-photon-
based MDI-QKD scheme, such as that in Ref. [33], we need
to estimate the single-photon contributions of the detection
at the receiver, which can be done efficiently using decoy
states [42–45]. In Ref. [33], a security analysis is provided
for the decoy-state MDI-QKD assuming infinitely long keys
with infinitely many decoy states. In this paper, we proceed
further and analyze the performance of decoy-state MDI-QKD
when only a finite number of decoy states are used. Moreover,
we consider statistical fluctuations caused by a finite-size key.
Such an analysis is crucial to ensure the security of MDI-QKD
in practical setups.
We note that the effect of finite size on MDI-QKD has also
been recently studied in an independent work by Song et al.
[46]. However, they only analyzed the vacuum + weak-decoy-
state protocol whereas we also analyze the vacuum + two-
weak-decoy-state protocol here taking advantage of our gen-
eral method which can easily be adapted to other decoy-state
protocols.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we briefly review the MDI-QKD scheme with decoy states. In
Sec. III, we investigate the QKD model for the security proof
and simulation. In Sec. IV, we perform a statistical fluctuation
analysis on MDI-QKD systems, followed by numerical results
in Sec. V. We conclude the paper in Sec. VI with remarks.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) A schematic diagram for the MDI-QKD protocol, where PBS stands for polarizing beam splitter and PM stands for
phase modulator. In order to encode their bits in the z basis, Alice and Bob generate phase-randomized coherent states with either H or V
polarizations at their sources. To encode a bit in the x or y basis, they generate +45-polarized signals at their encoders. A PM will introduce a
relative phase shift between their reference and signal beams. The phase shifts are chosen from the set {0,π} for the x basis and {π/2,3π/2}
for the y basis. A partial BSM, possibly performed by an untrusted party, Eve or Charlie, on the two reference and the two signal modes would
establish correlations between the raw key bits of Alice and Bob. If they both use the z basis, a click on exactly one of the r detectors and
exactly one of the s detectors would imply anticorrelated bits shared between Alice and Bob. For x and y bases, if they both use the same basis,
a joint click on detectors r0 and s0 implies identical bits for Alice and Bob; so does a joint click on r1 and s1. A joint click on r0 and s1, or, r1
and s0 would imply anticorrelated bits [38].
II. DECOY-STATE MDI-QKD
The most general encoding scheme for BB84-based QKD
relies on using two optical orthogonal modes. Here, we encode
a qubit in the z basis by using two spatially separated modes,
r and s, as shown in Fig. 1. That is, for the z basis, the
information is encoded in whether the photon is in mode r
or s. The qubit can also be encoded into the relative phases
between modes r and s. Denote x basis to be the case when
two relative phases {0,π} are used and y basis for {π/2,3π/2}.
This encoding is sufficiently general to be tailored down to all
proposed MDI-QKD schemes. For example, in the original
MDI-QKD [33], r and s correspond to H and V polarizations.
For BB84 encoding, the z and x basis is used [33]. We remark
that this setup can be used to implement the six-state QKD
protocol as well [47]. For practical purposes, one may consider
using temporal, rather than the spatial, modes as proposed
in Refs. [38,39]. Here, however, we are mostly concerned
with statistical fluctuation effects due to the finite size of the
key, and our results are independent of the employed setup.
The key assumption in all MDI-QKD schemes is that the
photons on which the intermediary BSM is performed are
indistinguishable. We assume this condition is held throughout
our analysis.
In this paper, we assume that Alice and Bob use coherent
states as their sources and use the z and x basis above for
encoding. The MDI-QKD scheme runs as follows.
(1) Alice randomly chooses a basis from {x,z} and a bit from
{0,1}, and sends a coherent-state pulse with intensity randomly
chosen from a predetermined set. As shown in Fig. 1, if she
picks the z basis, she prepares her coherent states with either
H or V polarizations depending on the bit value. Otherwise,
if she picks the x basis, she prepares +45-polarized signals,
splits the pulse into two modes, r and s, through a polarizing
beam splitter (PBS), and encodes the bit values into relative
phases, {0,π}, between the two modes. Bob applies the same
encoding procedure.
(2) Alice and Bob send the pulses to the relay, which can
be fully controlled by Eve. Eve performs a partial BSM on
the received pulses, as shown in Fig. 1. Eve announces her
detection results. She is allowed to be dishonest.
(3) Alice and Bob compare the bases used for all transmis-
sions which include the no-detection events, successful BSM
events, and unsuccessful BSM events.
(4) Based on Eve’s announcement for each pulse, Alice
and Bob keep the bit if it corresponds to a successful BSM
event and a compatible basis has been used. One of them also
flips the bit value in the case of an anticorrelated BSM result
(see Fig. 1). They discard all other bits corresponding to the
no-detection events, unsuccessful BSM events, and those with
incompatible bases.
(5) For each combination of Alice’s intensity μ, Bob’s
intensity ν, and basis w = x,z, they test the error rate Ewμν
of the retained bits, and compute the gain Qwμν by counting the
number of successful BSM events among all transmissions
(including the no-detection events, successful BSM events,
and unsuccessful BSM events) when Alice and Bob used
compatible bases. Thus, it is necessary for Alice and Bob
to compare their bases even for bits that have not resulted in a
successful BSM and are to be discarded.
(6) Alice and Bob estimate the yield Y z11 and the phase error
rate ex11 for the fraction of signals in which Alice has a single
052305-2
STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION ANALYSIS FOR . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 86, 052305 (2012)
photon and Bob has a single photon, based on the analysis
in Sec. IV. With this parameter estimation, Alice and Bob
perform error correction and privacy amplification to distill a
final secret key.
The analysis in the last step is the main focus of this work.
III. MODEL
The notations and definitions used in the model are listed
below.
(i) Alice and Bob each use coherent states to implement
decoy-state MDI-QKD. In addition to the signal state, different
intensities will be used for a number of decoy states. In this
section, we denote the mean number of photons in a certain
pulse sent by Alice and Bob, respectively, by μ and ν. In
subsequent sections, we introduce a more detailed notation as
needed for decoy states.
(ii) We use the term “i-photon channel” when a Fock
state with i photons is used as information carrier. We
denote the joint channel when Alice uses an i-photon channel
and Bob uses a j -photon channel by i unionmulti j channel, where
i,j = 0,1,2, . . . . When there is no ambiguity, we use μ unionmulti ν
channel to represent the case when Alice and Bob send out
coherent states with intensities μ and ν, respectively.
(iii) The overall gain Qwμν is defined as the probability
of obtaining a successful partial BSM when Alice and Bob
use the μ unionmulti ν channel and the w basis, where w = x,z. The
quantum bit error rate (QBER), Ewμν , is the corresponding error
probability.
(iv) The yield Ywij is the probability to obtain a successful
BSM when Alice and Bob use the i unionmulti j channel and the
w basis, where w = x,z, and ewij is the corresponding error
probability. The gain Qwij is defined as the probability that
Alice and Bob use the i unionmulti j channel and obtain a successful
partial BSM.
(v) Denote the transmittance of the channel between Alice
(Bob) and the relay to be ηa (ηb). Denote the dark count of
each detector by pd .
(vi) We assume the phase modulator (PM) and PBS devices
at Alice and Bob are perfect.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Upper bounds on the dropped terms in
Eq. (10). It can be seen that the effect of dropping higher-order terms
is negligible when the number of leading terms kept, k, is sufficiently
large.
A. Photon-number channel model
When the phases of the coherent states used by Alice and
Bob are randomized, the quantum channel can be modeled
as a photon-number channel model [43]. That is, Alice and
Bob randomly choose quantum channels (with a Poisson
distribution) with different Fock states. Thus, the gain and
QBER is composed of all the possible i unionmulti j channels,
Qwμν =
∑
i,j
μiνj
i!j !
e−μ−νYwij ,
(1)
EwμνQ
w
μν =
∑
i,j
μiνj
i!j !
e−μ−νewijY
w
ij ,
where w = x,z.
In the security proof, we assume that Eve has a full control
of Ywij and ewij ranging from 0 to 1. The purpose of using decoy
states is to estimate Ywij and ewij , with a particular interest in
Yw11 and ew11 as only the 1 unionmulti 1 channel contributes to the secret
key bits. The gain and QBER, Qwμν and Ewμν , on the other
hand, are observables for Alice and Bob and are used for the
above estimation.
B. Asymptotic case
In this section, we present the expected values for the
parameters of interest if an infinitely long key is used. These
analytical results can be obtained if we assume that the system
is operating under normal conditions. We emphasize that
the results of this simulation model can only be used for
simulation purposes, but not for the security proof. For the
postmeasurement processing of a real QKD experiment, the
key rate and the actual key are derived from the measurement
outcomes, which also include possible Eve’s intervention.
Here, we directly take the results from the Appendixes of
Ref. [38]. The observables we need to use for the simulation
are the following gains and QBERs:
Qxμν = 2y2[1 + 2y2 − 4yI0(x) + I0(2x)], (2)
ExμνQ
x
μν = e0Qxμν − 2(e0 − ed )y2[I0(2x) − 1],
and
Qzμν = QC + QE, EzμνQzμν = edQC + (1 − ed )QE, (3)
where
QC = 2(1 − pd )2e−μ′/2[1 − (1 − pd )e−ηaμ/2]
× [1 − (1 − pd )e−ηbν/2],
QE = 2pd (1 − pd )2e−μ′/2[I0(2x) − (1 − pd )e−μ′/2]. (4)
In the above equations, I0(x) is the modified Bessel function of
the first kind, ed represents the misalignment-error probability,
TABLE I. List of experimental parameters used in numerical
results: ed is the misalignment probability; pd is the background
count rate per detector; f is the error correction inefficiency; Ndata is
the number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob for each pair of intensities.
ed pd f Ndata
1.5% 3 × 10−6 1.16 2 × 1010
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TABLE II. Simulation values of the gain, Qwμν , w = x,z, for the vacuum + weak-decoy-state protocol, evaluated using Eqs. (2) and (3). It
is assumed that ηa = ηb = 0.1.
z basis x basis
Bob/Alice μ = 0 μ = 0.1 μ = 0.5 μ = 0 μ = 0.1 μ = 0.5
ν = 0 3.6000 × 10−11 5.9587 × 10−8 2.8900 × 10−7 3.5999 × 10−11 2.4873 × 10−5 6.0229 × 10−4
ν = 0.1 5.9587 × 10−8 4.9374 × 10−5 2.3935 × 10−4 2.4873 × 10−5 9.8876 × 10−5 8.6437 × 10−4
ν = 0.5 2.8900 × 10−7 2.3935 × 10−4 1.1603 × 10−3 6.0229 × 10−4 8.6437 × 10−4 2.3495 × 10−3
e0 = 1/2, and
x = √ηaμηbν/2,
y = (1 − pd )e−μ′/4, (5)
μ′ = ηaμ + ηbν.
We also need the gain of single-photon states, Qw11, w =
x,z, given by
Qw11 = μνe−μ−νYw11. (6)
Without Eve’s intervention, the yield and error rate of the 1 unionmulti 1
channel are given by
Y x11 = Y z11 = (1 − pd )2
[
ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd
+ 4(1 − ηa)(1 − ηb)p2d
]
,
(7)
ex11Y
x
11 = e0Y x11 − (e0 − ed )(1 − pd )2
ηaηb
2
,
ez11Y
z
11 = e0Y z11 − (e0 − ed )(1 − pd )2(1 − 2pd )
ηaηb
2
,
which will be used for the simulation of the asymptotic case.
IV. POSTPROCESSING
A. Key rate
The key rate is given by [33,43],
R  Qz11
[
1 − H (ex11)]− Iec, (8)
Iec = QzμνfH
(
Ezμν
)
,
where Iec is the cost of error correction, f is the error correction
efficiency, and H (e) = −e log2(e) − (1 − e) log2(1 − e) is the
binary Shannon entropy function. We assume that the final key
is extracted from the data measured in the z basis. Note that,
for single-photon states, the phase error probability in the z
basis is the bit error probability in the x basis, ex11, since single
photons form a basis-independent source [48].
TABLE III. Simulation values of QBER, Ewμν , w = x,z, for
different intensity values evaluated from Eqs. (2) and (3).
z basis x basis
Bob/Alice μ = 0.1 μ = 0.5 μ = 0.1 μ = 0.5
ν = 0.1 1.6164% 1.5700% 25.7184% 36.3867%
ν = 0.5 1.5700% 1.5236% 36.3867% 25.4516%
B. Parameter estimation
The postmeasurement processing of MDI-QKD includes
the two conventional stages of error correction and privacy
amplification. Error correction only depends on the directly
observable error rate Ezμν . Thus, the term Iec, in the key rate
formula of Eq. (8), is fixed. For privacy amplification, one
needs to estimate the parameters of the 1 unionmulti 1 channel, Qz11 and
ex11, with decoy states. Thus, the key point of the parameter
estimation in this stage is to estimate the privacy amplification
term, i.e., the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (8).
Assume that Alice uses ma phase-randomized coherent
states with intensities μ0,μ1, . . . ,μma−1, representing one
signal and ma − 1 decoy states, and Bob uses mb intensities
ν0,ν1, . . . ,νmb−1. Our objective is to solve the following [49]:
min
Ywij ,e
w
ij
Y z11
[
1 − H (ex11)] (9)
subject to
Qwμkνl =
∑
i,j
μikν
j
l
i!j !
e−μk−νl Y wij ,
(10)
EwμkνlQ
w
μkνl
=
∑
i,j
μikν
j
l
i!j !
e−μk−νl ewijY
w
ij
for k = 0,1, . . . ,ma − 1, l = 0,1, . . . ,mb − 1, and w = x,z.
The number of linear constraints in Ywij and ewijYwij is 4mamb.
In order to find the minimum in Eq. (9), we lower bound
Y z11 and upper bound ex11 separately.1 Both these problems can
be solved using linear programming, and that will provide us
with a lower bound on the optimal value that one can find by
directly solving the nonlinear minimization problem in Eq. (9).
Note that, even in our simplified approach, one must deal
with an infinite number of unknowns in Ywij and ewij , i,j =
0,1,2, . . . . In our numerical analysis, we take an additional
simplifying step and drop terms of higher orders in Eq. (10).
Because of the Poisson-distributed coefficients of Ywij and ewij ,
in Eq. (10), these terms decrease exponentially by increasing
i and j . From our numerical simulations, we find that the
effect of terms with i,j  7 on the parameter estimation is
negligible. To further verify this analytically, note that the sum
of the dropped terms of i,j  k in Eq. (10) is upper bounded
by τ (μ,k) := 1 − (∑k−1i=0 μii! e−μ)2 when considering Ywij = 1
and assuming that μ = μk = μl . Figure 2 shows τ (μ,k) for
three nominal values of μ and k = 6, . . . ,11. It turns out that
1To upper bound ex11, we divide the upper bound of ex11Y x11 with the
lower bound of Y x11.
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TABLE IV. Lower and upper bounds on Yw11 and ew11 in both bases, compared to asymptotic values. In our statistical fluctuation analysis,
five standard deviations are taken into consideration.
w = z w = x
Parameters Asymptotic value Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Yw11 5.0011 × 10−3 4.6043 × 10−3 6.0286 × 10−3 4.1343 × 10−3 6.6334 × 10−3
ew11 1.5108% 0.9556% 2.1341% 0 10.2126%
the neglected terms have insignificant impact on the values of
Yw11 and ew11Yw11 that we obtain in our simulations in Sec. V; see
Tables IV and V.
We follow the statistical fluctuation analysis proposed in
Ref. [44]. Then, the equalities in Eq. (10) becomes inequalities,
ˆQwμkνl (1 − βq) 
∑
i,j
μikν
j
l
i!j !
e−μk−νl Y wij  ˆQwμkνl (1 + βq),
ˆEwμkνl
ˆQwμkνl (1 − βeq) 
∑
i,j
μikν
j
l
i!j !
e−μk−νl ewijY
w
ij
 ˆEwμkνl ˆQ
w
μkνl
(1 + βeq), (11)
where if the left-hand side of the inequality is negative,
we replace it with 0. The variables ˆQwμkνl and ˆE
w
μkνl
are
measurement outcomes. That is, they are rates instead of
probabilities. The fluctuation ratio βq and βeq can be evaluated
by
βq = nα√
Nwμkνl
ˆQwμkνl
,
(12)
βeq = nα√
Nwμkνl
ˆEwμkνl
ˆQwμkνl
,
where Nwμkνl is the number of pulses, in the w basis, sent
out by Alice and Bob when they use intensities μk and νl ,
respectively; nα is the number of standard deviations one
chooses for statistical fluctuation analysis. In other words,
Nwμkνl
ˆQwμkνl is the number of successful partial BSMs when
Alice and Bob use intensities μk and νl , respectively, and
Nwμkνl
ˆEwμkνl
ˆQwμkνl is the corresponding error count. If we follow
the Gaussian assumption made in [44], the number of standard
deviations, nα , will be directly related to the failure probability
of this security analysis. For example, when nα = 5, as used
later, it will introduce a failure probability of 5.73 × 10−7.
V. SIMULATION
For simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob send the same
number of pulses for all μ unionmulti ν channels, denoted by Ndata. In
the following simulations, the parameters of the experimental
setup are listed in Table I.
In the simulation, we absorb the detection loss into channel
losses. Note that with the current development in high-
speed QKD systems [50–52], Ndata = 2 × 1010 pulses can be
transmitted in seconds. We assume that Alice and Bob pick
nα standard deviations for the statistical fluctuation analysis,
which is determined by the allowable failure probability for
the system.
A. Vacuum+weak-decoy-state protocol
We consider that Alice and Bob run the vacuum + weak-
decoy-state protocol [44] and they choose the same intensities
for the coherent states. Let us assume a typical set of intensities:
{0,0.1,0.5}. Note that we assume Ndata = 2 × 1010 for each
μ unionmulti ν channel. Thus, the total number of pulses sent by Alice
and Bob is 18 × 1010.
For each of the nine μ unionmulti ν channels, Alice and Bob can
obtain a set of linear inequalities, in the form of Eq. (11), for
gains and QBERs. As noted before, we neglect terms with
i,j  7, and find the lower bound on Y z11 and the upper bound
on ex11 using linear programming.
In order to obtain a sense of the magnitude of the parameter
values, we calculate the gains and QBERs, at ηa = ηb = 0.1,
using Eqs. (2) and (3) for the x and z basis. The gain values
are listed in Table II. The QBER of the case when either
party chooses the vacuum decoy state is 1/2 and that of the
remaining four nontrivial cases is shown in Table III, for the
x and z basis. Note that the QBER in the z basis is reasonably
close to ed as expected from Eqs. (3) and (7). The QBER in the
x basis, on the other hand, is larger than 25%, which is mainly
caused by false triggering of multiphoton states [33,38]. This
is the key reason why the final key in Eq. (8) should be only
extracted from the z basis.
TABLE V. Lower and upper bounds on Yw11 and ew11 in both bases, compared to asymptotic values. In our statistical fluctuation analysis, five
standard deviations are taken into consideration.
w = z w = x
Parameters Asymptotic value Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Yw11 5.0011 × 10−3 4.7058 × 10−3 5.2377 × 10−3 4.3734 × 10−3 5.5640 × 10−3
ew11 1.5108% 1.1103% 2.0409% 0 7.7954%
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Key rate versus channel transmittance
using vacuum + weak-decoy-state method for MDI-QKD.
In practice, ˆQwμν and ˆEwμν , similar to those in Tables II and
III, are derived from the raw data obtained in the experiment.
The task of the security analysis, which is the main focus of this
work, is to determine the final secure key rate for such sets of
data. Following the analysis given in Sec. IV B, here we mini-
mizeY z11 and maximize ex11 subject to constraints of Eq. (11), by
assuming that the values listed in Tables II and III are, respec-
tively, the measured gain and QBER in a certain experiment.
Table IV provides lower and upper bounds on these
parameters, obtained by solving the corresponding linear-
programming problems, and compared them with the expected
values from the simulation results of Eq. (7). From Table IV,
one can see that the parameter estimations in the x basis is
worse than those in the z basis. This is because multiphoton
terms contribute more to the gains and QBERs in the x basis
than in the z basis.
Substituting the parameter estimations from Table IV, the
lower bound of Y z11 and the upper bound of ex11, into Eq. (8),
one can calculate the key rate to be 6.89 × 10−5 bits/pulse.
Similarly, one can evaluate the dependence of the key rate on
channel transmittance, as shown in Fig. 3. One can see that
even by including statistical fluctuations the key rate decreases
linearly with channel loss before the cutoff regime. In the
low-loss regime, the vacuum + weak-decoy-state protocol
performs almost as well as the asymptotic case.
As shown in Fig. 3, with nα = 5 standard deviations, the
maximum tolerable transmission loss is almost 30 dB less
than that of the asymptotic case. Even if we do not take the
statistical fluctuations (nα = 0) into account, there is still a
gap between the two cases. Thus, there is big room for further
improvement. In the next simulation, we will consider three
decoy states and show that further improvements can be made
when more decoy states are applied.
B. Vacuum+ two-weak-decoy-state protocol
In order to give a better estimation of Y z11 and ex11, one
can use more than two decoy states. Let us assume that Alice
and Bob use four coherent states {0,0.1,0.2,0.5} and that we
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Key rate versus channel transmittance
using vacuum + two-weak-decoy-state method for MDI-QKD.
use Ndata = 2 × 1010 for each μ unionmulti ν channel. Thus, the total
number of pulses sent by Alice and Bob is 32 × 1010, corre-
sponding to 16 channels. Given that by adding an extra decoy
state on each side we can better estimate channel parameters,
the key rate is expected to be no less than the one in Sec. V A.
Similar to the previous section, we take ηa = ηb = 0.1 as
an example to see how accurate the parameter estimation is.
The bounds of Y z11 and ex11 in both bases, compared to the
asymptotic case, are listed in Table V. Again, the parameter
estimations in the x basis is worse than those in the z basis,
due to the multiphoton terms.
Similar to the vacuum + weak-decoy-state case, one can
calculate the key rate to be 1.09 × 10−4 bits/pulse by substi-
tuting the parameter estimations from Table V, the lower bound
of Y z11 and the upper bound of ex11, into Eq. (8). According to
Table V, our parameter estimation has improved when more
decoy states (in extra pulses) are applied, as compared to the
previous case in Table IV.
The dependence of the key rate on the channel transmittance
is shown in Fig. 4. One can see that the gap between the
finite-size case and the asymptotic case is smaller than the
one shown in Fig. 3. In the case of nα = 0, the vacuum + two-
weak-decoy-state protocol is very close to the asymptotic case.
This is different from regular decoy-state protocol, where two
decoy states are proven to be sufficient for practical usage [44].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that MDI-QKD is a highly practical scheme
even when the statistical fluctuations are accounted for. In
the low-loss regime, with only two or three decoy states, the
performance of MDI-QKD with statistical fluctuations is close
to that of the asymptotic case. At higher values of loss, using
three decoy states would be recommended. We remark that our
analysis is quite general and is applicable to different MDI-
QKD implementations such as those based on phase encoding
and/or polarization encoding as well as those those based on
the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol.
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